USA v. Christopher Lee by unknown
2017 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-12-2017 
USA v. Christopher Lee 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Christopher Lee" (2017). 2017 Decisions. 519. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017/519 
This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2017 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 










 CHRISTOPHER G. LEE, 
     Appellant 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 4-14-cr-00254-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Matthew W. Brann 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 15, 2017 
 
Before:   SMITH, Chief Judge, JORDAN, and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges. 
 






JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Christopher Lee supervised high school aged minors who volunteered as docents 
at the Boal Mansion Museum in Boalsburg, Pennsylvania.  After one of the young 
                                              
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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docents accused him of sexual assault, the police obtained a search warrant for the Boal 
Mansion, where Lee resided.  The search ultimately led to the acquisition of additional 
search warrants which uncovered many images of the young docents cropped to focus on 
their genitals and thousands of images of child pornography evidently downloaded from 
the internet.  Lee was convicted of receiving and possessing child pornography, sexual 
exploitation of children, and, because of actions he took after his arrest, attempted 
obstruction of justice.   
 On appeal, Lee argues that the state magistrate who issued a warrant to search for 
child pornography did not have probable cause and therefore the evidence against him 
should have been excluded.  He also argues that the prosecution failed to prove that he 
intended to produce sexually explicit images when he photographed the minors.  
Additionally, he claims that it was unfairly prejudicial for the District Court to allow the 
jury to hear certain sexually explicit stories that were found on Lee’s computer.  Finally, 
he argues that there was insufficient evidence that he had taken a substantial step towards 
the obstruction of justice.  All of Lee’s arguments lack merit, and we will, therefore, 
affirm the District Court’s rulings in all respects.   
I. Facts1 
Lee operated the Boal Mansion Museum, and, as noted, he invited young people to 
work there as docents.  The teenagers, usually boys, would live at the Mansion during 
                                              
1 Because Lee challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 
conviction, we “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government[.]”  





their time as volunteers.  In June 2014, police officers from the neighboring town of State 
College received a report of an indecent assault.  A 17-year-old who had traveled to 
Boalsburg to participate in the docent program alleged that Lee had attempted to touch 
his genitals and entice him to engage in sexual contact.  The youth claimed that, in 
preparation for those advances, Lee played a video on his laptop computer that included 
“weird music” that may have contained a “relaxation message” or been “hypnotic.”  
(App. at 79, 81.)  Based on those allegations, State College Police Officers acquired 
warrants to search Boal Mansion and seize Lee’s electronic devices.  They seized two 
cell phones, a laptop computer, a desktop computer, a portable hard drive, and a flash 
drive, all belonging to Lee.  The officers subsequently requested and were granted a 
warrant to search the contents of Lee’s laptop in order to find the video recording as well 
as any communications between Lee and the youth’s parents planning for his 
participation in the docent program.   
A member of the Computer Forensics Unit of the Pennsylvania Attorney 
General’s Office searched the laptop and found the video that had been described.  In the 
process, he also came across a video that depicted a naked and masturbating male who 
appeared to be under the age of eighteen.  The examination of the computer stopped 
while the State College Police received another warrant to search the electronic devices 
for child pornography and related files.  The application for the search warrant included a 
screenshot from the pornographic video.  The warrant was granted and the search 
uncovered additional child pornography.  More search warrants, acquired in conjunction 
with investigative efforts by the FBI, led to the examination of additional devices, 
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including an external hard drive, another portable hard drive, and several thumb drives.  
In total, the police seized eight devices containing sexual content involving minors, such 
as thousands of graphic images of prepubescent boys and lists of websites known for 
child pornography.   
Some of the devices included photographs and videos that Lee had taken of the 
teenagers participating in the docent program.  Lee had edited the images to focus on the 
children’s genitals, buttocks, or pubic areas.  For instance, one of the images shows a 
young man “getting out of the pool with his legs spread apart and wearing a bathing 
suit[.]”  (App. at 511.)  The image is cropped to focus on his crotch and “[h]is genitalia is 
evident beneath the clothing[.]”  (Id.)  
In addition to the images, the police found 26 sexually explicit stories featuring 
young boys.  Lee placed images into the narratives to illustrate the stories.  Some of the 
stories were illustrated with pornographic images of children that were not personally 
known to Lee.  Other stories were illustrated with the cropped images of the youth from 
the docent program.  The narratives were created under the computer user name of 
“Christopher Lee.”  The documents were comingled with Lee’s personal documents and 
photos and used the same password for access.     
 Lee was arrested and charged with crimes related to the sexual exploitation of 
minors.  While incarcerated, he made a series of phone calls to his cousin.  Lee evidently 
got frustrated and asked the cousin to retrieve Lee’s cell phone from the FBI and to 
contact an individual who could “wipe” the data from the phone.  (App. at 965a, 966a, 
971a.)  When the cousin did not do so, Lee asked the cousin to give him the contact 
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information for the individual so that he could make that request himself.  Despite his 
efforts, Lee was unsuccessful in getting the data on the phone deleted.     
In total, the grand jury charged Lee with eight offenses, though only four are 
relevant to this appeal: receipt of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252A(a)(2); possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252A(a)(5)(B); sexual exploitation of children, with regard to the cropped images that 
Lee produced, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a); and attempting to obstruct justice by 
tampering with evidence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1).2   
Lee filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from his electronic devices, 
claiming that the application for a warrant to search the electronic devices for child 
pornography did not provide a basis for finding probable cause.  The District Court 
denied Lee’s motion.  Lee also filed a motion in limine seeking to prevent the sexual 
narratives from being read to the jury or at least to have them significantly redacted 
before the jury could hear them.  The District Court refused to redact or exclude the three 
narratives selected by the government for presentation to the jury.  In the Court’s view, 
“[t]he narratives and images of children are … closely bound in both logical and 
proximate terms” and the narratives would provide the jury with “highly probative 
insights into [Lee’s] intent, knowledge, and absence of a mistake[.]”  (App. at 1025 
(relying on Rule 404(b)(2)).)  At trial, the government presented the selected narratives to 
                                              
2 Two counts stemming from the alleged molestation of the 17-year-old student 
were severed and the government moved to dismiss those counts before they could be 
brought before a jury.  Two additional counts relating to the alleged sexual assault of 




the jury.  Lee was convicted on all the counts that went to the jury.  He then filed this 
timely appeal.     
II. Discussion3 
 Lee raises four challenges to his convictions.  We take them in the following 
order:  First, he argues that the evidence acquired from his electronic devices should have 
been suppressed as the result of an unlawful search.  Next, he argues that there was 
insufficient evidence to support his conviction for the sexual exploitation of minors.  He 
also argues that the District Court erred in allowing the jury to hear the sexually explicit 
narratives.  Finally, Lee argues that there was insufficient evidence that he attempted to 
obstruct justice.   
A. The Motion to Suppress 
Lee argues that the affidavit accompanying the officer’s request for a warrant to 
search for child pornography was insufficiently detailed and did not provide the 
magistrate with probable cause to issue a warrant.4  We review “the District Court’s 
denial of a motion to suppress for clear error as to the underlying factual findings and 
exercise[] plenary review of the District Court’s application of the law to those facts.”  
United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d. Cir. 2002).  When evaluating whether 
                                              
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
4 As discussed above, police officers executed several search warrants on Boal 
Mansion and Lee’s electronic devices.  The first warrant to search Lee’s computer was 
granted in order to find the video containing hypnotic music described by the minor who 




there was probable cause to issue a search warrant, “our role is not to make our own 
assessment as to whether probable cause existed.  Rather, we are constrained to 
determine only whether the affidavit provides a sufficient basis for the decision the 
magistrate judge actually made.”  United States v. Jones, 994 F.2d 1051, 1057 (3d Cir. 
1993).   
A warrant is valid if, given the totality of the circumstances, there is a “fair 
probability that … evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”  Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). With respect to “a warrant application to search for 
child pornography, a magistrate must be able to independently evaluate whether the 
contents of the alleged images meet the legal definition of child pornography.”  United 
States v. Pavulak, 700 F.3d 651, 661 (3d Cir. 2012).  That evaluation can occur “in one of 
three ways: (1) the magistrate can personally view the images; (2) the search-warrant 
affidavit can provide a sufficiently detailed description of the images; or (3) the search-
warrant application can provide some other facts that tie the images’ contents to child 
pornography.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  At least one of those 
ways was satisfied here, and arguably all three were.   
 First, the magistrate was provided with a screenshot of the youth depicted in the 
video.  Lee argues that the screenshot was inadequate because the image is somewhat 
unclear in the copy of the application that is in the record.  Lee gives us no reason to 
believe that the image was blurry when originally presented to the magistrate.  But, 
because the District Court “ha[d] no knowledge as to whether the magistrate judge was 
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provided with a more-discernable copy[,]” it did not rely on that image.  (App. at 16 n.2.)  
We likewise do not need to rely on it to conclude that probable cause was established.  
 Second, the affidavit provided the magistrate with a “sufficiently detailed” 
description of the images to conclude they contained child pornography.  Id.  The officers 
reported that the video depicted “a young white male standing naked and masturbating.”  
(App. at 75.)  This is not a case where the officers merely asserted that there was child 
pornography without “provid[ing] any further details about what the images depicted.”  
Pavulak, 700 F.3d at 661.  In addition, a total of three officers saw the pornographic 
video and affirmed that the youth in the video appeared to be a minor.  The first was an 
officer of the Computer Forensics Unit with 25 years of law enforcement experience, 
including viewing thousands of images and videos of alleged child pornography.  The 
other two officers also had experience with numerous child pornography investigations.  
A pediatrician also watched the video and indicated that the male in the video appeared to 
be under the age of eighteen.  Lee argues that their declarations were inadequate because 
none was certain that the youth was a minor.  While none of the four were certain about 
the age of the child, certainty is not a requirement for probable cause.  Gates, 462 U.S. at 
238 (asking whether there was a “fair probability” that “evidence of a crime will be 
found”).  The description of the video and the declarations of multiple witnesses with 
extensive qualifications and professional experience were highly credible and provided 
probable cause.   
Third, the magistrate could also rely on the circumstances surrounding the request 
for a warrant which “tie the [video’s] contents to child pornography.”  Pavulak, 700 F.3d 
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at 661.  Lee had been accused of molesting a teenage boy and that accusation had been 
partially corroborated by the discovery of the hypnotic video on the laptop.  Even if it 
was not clear that the individual in the pornographic video was a minor, that was a 
reasonable inference for the magistrate to draw in light of the other evidence 
corroborating, at least in part, the accusations against Lee.  Cf. United States v. Ventresca, 
380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment does not “den[y] … the 
support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence” (citation 
omitted)).  As the officers declared in the affidavit supporting the search warrant 
application, based on their “training and experience[,] … individuals who view child 
pornography and perpetrate [crimes] on minors often view multiple images and store and 
keep those images on the[ir] computers in various forms.”  (App. at 75.)  Based on that 
inference, the magistrate could conclude that there was a “fair probability” that a search 
would uncover additional evidence of child pornography.  Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.  
Accordingly, there was a sufficient basis for the magistrate’s probable cause 
determination.5   
B. Sexual Exploitation of Minors 
Lee’s conviction for sexual exploitation of minors under 18 U.S.C. § 2251 was 
based on the cropped photographs found on Lee’s electronic devices of the boys 
participating in the Boal Mansion docent program.  On appeal, Lee challenges for the 
first time the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction.  Accordingly, we 
                                              
5 The parties argue over whether the good faith exception would apply in the event 
that we found that the search warrant was invalid.  Because we conclude that the warrant 
was valid, we need not consider those arguments.   
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review the sufficiency of the evidence for plain error.  United States v. Gaydos, 108 F.3d 
505, 509 (3d Cir. 1997) (explaining that when a criminal defendant has not “fil[ed] a 
timely motion for a judgment of acquittal … we review the sufficiency of the evidence 
under a plain error standard”).  Under plain error review, we will overturn the jury’s 
verdict only if, viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable” to the government, no 
“rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on 
the available evidence.”  United States v. Wolfe, 245 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing 
Jackson v Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)). 
Section 2251 provides that “[a]ny person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, 
entices, or coerces any minor to engage in, … with the intent that such minor engage in, 
any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such 
conduct,” is guilty of sexually exploiting a minor.  18 U.S.C. § 2251(a).  “[S]exually 
explicit conduct” is defined, in relevant part, as the “lascivious exhibition of the genitals 
or pubic area[.]”  18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A)(v).  In United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 745 
(3d Cir. 1994), we concluded that a “lascivious exhibition” is any “depiction which 
displays or brings forth to view in order to attract notice to the genitals or pubic area of 
children, in order to excite lustfulness or sexual stimulation in the viewer.”  We rejected 
the requirement that such a depiction must involve nudity, id., or “that the contours of the 
genitals or pubic area be discernible or otherwise visible through the child subject’s 
clothing.”  Id. at 746.  Instead, a depiction “requires only that the material depict some 
sexually explicit conduct by the minor subject which appeals to the lascivious interest of 
the intended audience.”  Id. at 747 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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 Lee concedes that at least some of the photographs in question were lascivious in 
nature.6  (Reply Br. at 4 (explaining that “it was not disputed at trial that the cropped 
images at issue were lascivious” and that “[w]hether the photographs were lascivious was 
not an issue raised on appeal.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).)  Instead of arguing 
that the images were not lascivious, Lee argues that the government failed to establish 
that, when he took the pictures, he had the specific criminal intent required by § 2251.  
The government had to prove that Lee took his photographs and videos “for the purpose 
of producing any visual depiction” of a minor who was “engage[d] in[] any sexually 
explicit conduct[.]”  18 U.S.C. § 2251(a); see also Knox, 32 F.3d at 749 (“The harm 
Congress attempted to eradicate by enacting the child pornography laws is present when 
a photographer unnaturally focuses on a minor child’s clothed genital area with the 
obvious intent to produce an image sexually arousing to pedophiles.”); United States v. 
Larkin, 629 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming a sexual exploitation conviction 
because the defendant had “designed the image depicted in th[e] photograph to arouse”).  
 We conclude that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the jury’s 
conviction of Lee.  In particular, the sexually explicit stories strongly suggest that Lee 
took the images with the requisite intent.  The cropped images were closely connected to 
the narratives that Lee illustrated.  For instance, one story describes a child wearing the 
                                              
6 As he should.  The images were edited specifically to focus on the youths’ pubic 
region.  Some of the images were also cropped to suggest sexual conduct or a willingness 
to engage in sexual conduct, such as an image that appeared to depict one boy touching 
another boy’s genitals, and another where a boy appeared to be touching himself.  Thus, 
there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the images were sexually 
explicit in nature.  See United States v. Villard, 885 F.2d 117, 122 (3d Cir. 1989) (listing 
factors that we consider to determine if an image is sexually explicit).   
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same clothing that the child in a photograph wore.  Another story has a child telling an 
adult to “let me sleep” and the accompanying image came from a video where one of the 
youth said the same thing to Lee.  (App. at 542.)  Given the close nexus between the 
images and the stories, it was reasonable to conclude that Lee took the photos with the 
intent of editing them and constructing a sexually explicit narrative around them.   
 Another factor that indicates intent is the large number of images and stories that 
the police uncovered.  Cf. United States v. Ortiz-Graulau, 526 F.3d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 2008) 
(“[T]he number of photographs, many of sexually explicit poses, permits a strong 
inference that some of the conduct occurred in order to make the photographs.”).  With 
over two dozen stories, scores of sexually explicit cropped images, and thousands of 
images of child pornography found on Lee’s devices, it was natural to conclude that Lee 
took pictures of youth with his pornographic predilection in mind rather than innocently.  
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury 
could infer that Lee took the photographs with the intent of creating child pornography.  
Thus, there was no plain error.   
C. Motion in Limine  
 Before trial, Lee filed a motion in limine, arguing that the sexually explicit stories 
that he wrote ought to be either redacted or excluded from the jury as inadmissible 
propensity evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).  The government responded 
that the stories qualified as evidence “intrinsic,” (App. at 1027), to the charged offense 
and that there was therefore no need to consider whether the stories were admitted for a 
proper purpose under Rule 404(b).  See United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 245 (3d 
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Cir. 2010) (“Extrinsic evidence must be analyzed under Rule 404(b); intrinsic evidence 
need not be.”).  The District Court decided to apply Rule 404(b) and concluded that the 
stories were admissible to prove Lee’s “intent, knowledge, and absence of a mistake[.]”  
(App. at 1025.)  We review for abuse of discretion the District Court’s decision to admit 
the evidence, and there was no such abuse.7  United States v. Daraio, 445 F.3d 253, 259 
(3d Cir. 2006).  
 Rule 404(b) prohibits the admission of evidence to prove action in conformity 
with a character or trait.  Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).  Thus, the stories could not be admitted to 
prove that Lee was prone to taking sexually explicit pictures because of his interest in 
pornographic narratives.  However, Rule 404(b)(2) allows for the admission of evidence 
of a defendant’s actions to prove, “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”  The stories were 
admissible under that rule for several reasons.  First, as already noted, they were helpful 
in proving Lee’s motive, intent, or plan.  The stories also showed that the images were 
intentionally cropped to parallel certain story lines and to be titillating and lascivious in 
nature.  Cf. United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 538 (3d Cir. 2010) (admitting 
lawful but sexually suggestive images into evidence because they “tended to disprove any 
argument that [the defendant] unknowingly possessed” unlawful pornographic images); 
                                              
7 The government makes a strong case that the narratives were “intrinsic” because 
they “directly prove[d],” United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 249 (3d Cir. 2010), that 
Lee had the required specific intent at the time when he took the images.  However, 
because the narratives were clearly admissible under Rule 404(b), we do not need to 




United States v. Dornhofer, 859 F.2d 1195, 1199 (4th Cir. 1988) (explaining that “[t]he 
fact that [a defendant] had a notebook containing pictures of nude children, [and] novels 
dealing with incest … makes [the defendant’s] claim that he ordered the child 
pornography by mistake less probable”).  Additionally, Lee argued that the images were 
cropped by someone other than him.  But the content of the stories strongly suggested 
that they were written by him.  In particular, the stories are told from the perspective of 
an adult male watching over teenagers and contain other parallels to Lee’s life, such as 
the protagonist teaching the children in the story to play guitar as Lee did with the 
docents.  Reading the stories to the jury thus helped to rebut Lee’s central defense.   
The District Court also was within its discretion when it determined that the 
danger of unfair prejudice from the narratives did not substantially outweigh their 
probative value.  Fed. R. Evid. 403.  The narratives were highly probative, showing that 
Lee took the pictures with the requisite intent.  While the stories were graphic and 
unquestionably prejudicial, the prejudicial impact was not unfair.  Moreover, any risk of 
unfair prejudice was limited by several actions taken at trial.  See Vosburgh, 602 F.3d at 
538 (noting in a similar context that the use of limiting instructions reduced the risk of 
prejudice).  The government presented to the jury only “three documents selected from a 
set of twenty-six narrated stories[.]”  (App. at 1037.)  And the District Court gave 
limiting instructions noting that the “composition and possession of those fictional stories 
alone [is] not illegal.”  (App. at 1037.)  It explained that the “writings were introduced for 
a limited purpose” under Rule 404(b).  (App. at 1037-38.)  While it was within the 
District Court’s discretion to partially redact the narratives, it was not required to do so.  
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In light of the high probative value of the three stories and the limiting instructions read 
to the jury, there was clearly no abuse of discretion in allowing the jury to hear that 
sample of the narratives. 
D. Obstruction of Justice 
 Finally, Lee argues that there was insufficient evidence that he attempted to 
obstruct justice by tampering with evidence.  Specifically, he suggests that his conviction 
for that crime is invalid because he did not take a “substantial step” toward the 
obstruction of justice.  See United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 202 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(explaining that a conviction for attempt generally requires that a “defendant must (1) 
have the intent needed to commit a crime defined … and must (2) perform an act 
amounting to a ‘substantial step’ toward the commission of that crime”).  Because Lee 
did not make a motion for a judgment of acquittal, we again review for plain error, 
Gaydos, 108 F.3d at 509, and under that standard it is easy to reject his argument.   
 The record shows that Lee took several substantial steps directed at obstructing 
justice.  In particular, he told his cousin to retrieve his phone from the FBI and have 
someone wipe the data from it.  When that did not happen, he then told his cousin to have 
the phone wiped remotely.  He continued to ask his cousin if he had successfully had the 
phone wiped.  And when his cousin refused to destroy the evidence as Lee demanded, 
Lee asked for the contact information for someone who could wipe the phone so that Lee 
himself could make the arrangements.  In light of that evidence, the jury could reasonably 
conclude that Lee had taken a substantial step towards the obstruction of justice.  See 
United States v. Gordon, 710 F.3d 1124, 1152 (10th Cir. 2013) (upholding a conviction 
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for attempted obstruction of justice when a defendant took a “tangible act” that “strongly 
corroborate[d] the firmness of the defendant’s intent to carry out the substantive 
offense”).  Accordingly, there was no error, let alone plain error, in Lee’s conviction on 
that count.  
III. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm Lee’s conviction. 
